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Introduction
The premise of federal supremacy (or preemption) is elementary.1 When a state law conflicts with a federal law, the Supremacy Clause provides a resolution: federal law trumps state law.2 For nearly three decades, however, the alluring simplicity of Supremacy Clause conflicts masks what is actually a confused doctrine.3 No unequivocal answer exists to the question of whether the Supremacy Clause provides an independent cause of action.4 Rather than offering clarity, the U.S. Supreme Court recently injected even more uncertainty into the arena when it passed on an opportunity to answer the question that has long simmered in the background of certain preemption cases.5
1 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (noting that state laws contrary to the laws of Congress are invalid because "[i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it"); Mary Ann K. Bosack, Cigarette Act Preemption-Refining the Analysis, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 756, 761 (1991) ("When Congress legislates in an area within its constitutional grant of power, the supremacy clause mandates that federal law displace state law.").
2 U.S. Const. art. VI; Bosack, supra note 1, at 761. The confusion does not arise in all preemption contexts.6 For instance, a defendant asserting preemption as a defense need not rely on a cause of action, whether located in the Supremacy Clause or elsewhere.7 A plaintiff who relies on a federal statute that creates a cause of action or a constitutional provision that creates a federal right (such as the Commerce Clause) likewise is not affected by the abstract question of whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action.8 Instead, the question that remains unanswered comes up in a narrow but important class of cases in which a federal law alleged to preempt a state law does not contain a private cause of action.9 In those cases, plaintiffs swing preemption as a sword to seek prospective relief in the form of injunctions against state action and declaratory judgments of unconstitutionality. 10 These preemption plaintiffs arrive at the courthouse in one of two vehicles: they either explicitly allege federal preemption of state law,11 or they imply federal preemption of state law.12 The different treatment afforded such plaintiffs in preemption cases has not only led to the question of whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action, but also defined the contours of a tentative answer.13
6 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992) (asserting preemption in defense).
7 Id.; see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (asserting preemption in defense to an alleged violation of a state law regarding pesticide use).
8 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1, 199-200. The Gibbons plaintiff had no need for a statutory cause of action when it could rely on the Commerce Clause to assert that a state law regulating navigation of state waters conflicted with the Commerce Clause and therefore violated the plaintiff's rights under the Commerce Clause. Id. 9 See infra notes 90-189 and accompanying text. 10 See generally Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (involving a suit prospectively seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against a pending state employment law on grounds that contrary federal law preempted it). In this respect, prospective preemption plaintiffs differ from traditional preemption plaintiffs in that traditional preemption plaintiffs seek to remedy an injury an allegedly preempted law or action already caused. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540 (2001) (challenging a state tobacco advertising regulation as preempted by federal law after the state regulation limited the ability of the tobacco company to advertise).
11 See infra notes 99-160 and accompanying text. This Note examines that preemption doctrine and its incongruity: different classes of plaintiffs are burdened with different cause of action requirements in the shadow of the Supremacy Clause.14 The evolution of constitutional law has produced various doctrines-cause of action,15 jurisdiction,16 and standing17-to ensure that federal courts properly adjudicate valid "cases or controversies" pursuant to Article III of the Constitution.18 Notwithstanding the command of Article III, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have permitted some types of preemption plaintiffs to pursue claims without demonstrating a valid cause of action.19 The implication for these plaintiffs who prospectively assert preemption is that the Supremacy Clause provides not only federal court jurisdiction but also a cause of action where one does not otherwise exist in the federal law alleged to preempt the conflicting state law or action.20
Jurisdiction, or the power of a federal court to hear a case, has long been found to exist in Supremacy Clause cases.21 In February 2012, the Supreme Court declined to define the extent to which the Supremacy Clause also provides a cause of action.22 After initially granting certiorari to review the specific question of whether the Supremacy Clause provided a cause of action for certain preemption plaintiffs, a 5-4 Court remanded the case to the lower court for further argument on the same question, leaving the state of the doctrine particularly uncertain. 23 This Note argues that unless and until the Supreme Court holds that the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action, a distinction among plaintiffs in which some are and others are not found to have a valid cause of action is without merit.24 All preemption plaintiffs should Curiously, no one-not the justices and not the state defendant-stopped to ask whether the nonprofit corporation had a valid cause of action. Id. 14 See infra notes 90-270 and accompanying text. be required to establish a valid cause of action independent of the Supremacy Clause to satisfy the adjudicatory principles of the federal judiciary. 25 The current doctrine that affords varying cause of action requirements for different plaintiffs harms principles of fairness,26 infringes on the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure,27 and undermines federalism goals.28 Part I navigates the historical development of the Supremacy Clause, illustrating its grounding in preemption cases.29 Part II lays out the important roles that jurisdiction and cause of action play in federal court and how those roles affect preemption cases.30 Although cause of action and jurisdiction generally establish a plaintiff's right to be in federal court and the court's power to hear the case, only jurisdiction appears to be necessary for some preemption plaintiffs.31 Part II also introduces the reality that varying standards exist for different types of preemption plaintiffs, particularly with respect to the cause of action requirement.32
In Part III, the Note closely examines the cause of action burdens for those different types of preemption plaintiffs: those who expressly allege preemption and those who imply preemption.33 In this examination, Part III highlights the considerably different treatment with respect to the Supremacy Clause and cause of action analysis afforded plaintiffs with merely subtle differences.34 In Part IV, the Note analyzes the impact of this varying treatment and argues for a clearer standard for all preemption plaintiffs, thereby staying true to historical intent, the separation-of-powers constitutional framework, and federalism principles.35
I. Supremacy Clause Evolution
Modern preemption doctrine derives from Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, which has evolved from the nation's founding to present day.36 The arc of this evolution helps explain the Court's contemporary approach to federal preemption cases and ultimately helps answer the question of whether the Supremacy Clause confers a cause of action or merely ranks federal over state rights.37
The Supremacy Clause was adopted to resolve an embarrassing power struggle for the young United States.38 When the Constitutional Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787, they convened amidst-indeed, because of-a disturbing reality: the failure of the Articles of Confederation to establish an effective, stable, and cohesive governing structure.39 Handcuffed by substantial state power and independence, Congress struggled to raise money to repay war debts to Revolutionary soldiers, manage the nation's western expansion, and engage with a single national voice in effective and meaningful foreign relations.40 Indeed, uncertainty, as much as anything else, defined who was and who was not sovereign in the new America.41 State governments promoted the public's general distrust of government.42 The 1780s saw overregulation, chaotic procedures of passing and repealing laws, and commercially damaging ex post facto laws. 43 Frustrated with such circumstances, the Framers restructured American government, including notions of separation of powers and a federalism that clarified the allocation of sovereign authority in the constitutional architecture.44 To support this structure, the Framers [T]he act of Pennsylvania upon which this indictment is founded, is unconstitutional and void. It purports to punish as a public offence against that state, the very act of seizing and removing a slave, by his master, which the constitution of the United States was designed to justify and uphold. federal power shall be limited in scope while "powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State").
63 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Bates, 544 U.S. at 449 ("[W]e would nevertheless have a duty to accept the reading that disfavors preemption. 'Because the states are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action.'" (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))); Davis, supra note 36, at 973-75.
II. A Working Relationship: Cause of Action and Jurisdiction in the Prospective Preemption Context
All preemption cases, whether preemption is asserted prospectively or defensively, turn on the effect of the Supremacy Clause.64 But for a preemption plaintiff to persuade a court to reach the merits of the claim under the Supremacy Clause, the plaintiff must demonstrate valid subject matter jurisdiction and a valid cause of action.65 This Part shows that the separate concepts of jurisdiction and cause of action work together to establish or deny federal court authority over a case, substantially influencing prospective preemption outcomes.66 The Part further shows that the Court's contemporary approach in preemption cases has created ambiguity about the relationship between jurisdiction and cause of action.67
When a federal court analyzes jurisdiction, it examines its powerboth constitutional and statutory-to hear a case or controversy.68 Subject to congressional constraints, federal courts only possess power to hear cases that fall within those bounds of Article III of the Constitution.69
In contrast to a jurisdictional analysis, a federal court analyzing the validity of a cause of action focuses not so much on its power to hear a case as on the plaintiff's power to assert a complaint.70 The Court articulated the subtle but important difference between jurisdiction and cause of action analyses in Davis v. Passman in 1979 when it said that "jurisdiction is a question of whether a federal court has the power . . . to hear a case" while "cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court."71
So although a federal court may have proper jurisdiction to hear a case, if a plaintiff sues pursuant to a federal statute or constitutional provision that does not contain a cause of action, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted.72 The Constitution explicitly provides causes of action in two situations: the guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus73 and just compensation in the event of a property taking.74 Supreme Court precedent has further established that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment imply causes of action to plaintiffs asserting denials of such protections.75 Where individual rights are found in the Constitution, the Passman Court held, the Constitution implies a cause of action.76 To demonstrate a statutory (as opposed to Constitutional) cause of action, a plaintiff must prove that Congress intended to create a cause of action by pointing to statutory "rights-creating" language.77 In Alexander v. Sandoval, a 2001 case where the preemption allegation was implied, the Court, sensitive to separation-of-powers principles,78 found no evidence that Congress intended to create a private cause of action to enforce the disparate-impact regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.79 Without a valid cause of action, the Court held that an individual could not sue the Director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety for administering drivers' license examinations in a way that allegedly violated the regulations so as to be preempted by Title VI.80 Proper jurisdiction notwithstanding, the Court found the suit to be without merit because of lack of a cause of action.81
Both jurisdiction and cause of action must be found for a case to survive in federal court,82 and the extent to which a cause of action exists can help inform a court of its jurisdiction.83 In the contemporary Fourteenth Amendment to hold that nonrefunded coercive taxes violated plaintiffs' constitutionally established due process rights).
76 See Passman, 442 U.S. at 242. The Passman Court noted that, beginning with Marbury, the Court has long recognized a cause of action in constitutional rights: "[T]hose litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights." Id.
77 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13 ("[T]he right-or duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action.").
78 See 532 U.S. at 287 (noting that it would be improper for the federal judiciary to create a cause of action when Congress has not conferred such a right).
79 Id. at 293 ("Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602."). 83 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 746 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that, if an affirmative federal cause of action is found, then federal question jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331 is presumed, thereby enabling a federal court to expand its federal question jurisdiction by finding an implied cause of action in a federal statute). For instance, in Marbury, a case more famous for establishing judicial review, the Court in 1803 separately examined whether the plaintiff had a proper cause of action and whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. See 5 U.S. at 168, 173, 177. Finding a cause of action, but not jurisdiction preemption context, however, the Court has obscured the relationship between cause of action and jurisdiction.84 Whereas a valid cause of action and proper jurisdiction generally must exist,85 specific categories of preemption cases have prompted a question about whether the Supremacy Clause implies a cause of action.86 For some plaintiffs suing a state officer for prospective relief when preemption was expressly alleged or characterized, the Court has focused solely on whether it possessed jurisdiction-foregoing cause of action analysis.87 In other preemption cases, when preemption was implied or expressly alleged in combination with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the Court has analyzed jurisdiction as well as cause of action, requiring both.88 This confusion continues unabated in light of the Court's February 2012 decision in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. when it declined to answer the specific question about whether the Supremacy Clause conferred a cause of action for preemption plaintiffs alleging preemption of state action by a federal law that did not contain an evident private cause of action.89 (the power to hear the case) under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court refused to grant relief, despite acknowledging the plaintiff's statutory injury. Id. at 173, 180. Indeed, 198 years after Marbury, the Court continued to adhere to the principle that jurisdiction and cause of action both must exist for federal court adjudication. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293; Marbury, 5 U.S. at 168, 173. 84 See Sloss, supra note 37, at 358-60 (noting that jurisdiction is enough to qualify some prospective preemption plaintiffs for federal court adjudication, but that a valid cause of action is necessary for others).
85 
III. Presentation of the Prospective Preemption Case: Characterization and Categorization Matters
A plaintiff's preemption claim can either explicitly or implicitly allege preemption.90 An explicit allegation specifically asserts in the claim for relief that federal law preempts contrary state law or action.91 An implicit allegation implies preemption by asserting in the claim for relief that state law or action violates a federal right.92 The cause of action burden in a preemption case depends significantly on the explicitness of the preemption claim.93 This Part identifies the differences in asserting preemption implicitly versus explicitly.94 It demonstrates that different types of plaintiffs appear to have different cause of action requirements.95
Section A explores the types of plaintiffs who have no cause of action requirement, seemingly because they explicitly allege preemption.96 Demonstrating the importance of litigation strategy and characterization, Section B describes litigants who are required to demonstrate a cause of action independent of the Supremacy Clause.97 Both litigants who imply preemption or who explicitly allege preemption and sue pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fall into this category.98
90 See Sloss, supra note 37, at 359 (dividing prospective preemption cases into "Shaw preemption cases" in which preemption is alleged explicitly and "Shaw violation cases" in which preemption is implied in an allegation that state or local action violates federal law). 128 See id. Upon establishing that it had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331, the Court addressed cause of action, stating that "[i]t is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Id.
129 See id. Verizon is included in the explicit allegation of preemption category because the Court explicitly characterized the dispute as one of "preemption." See id. Arguably, the case could fall into the implicit allegation of preemption category because Verizon's allegation was that the state agency order violated federal law. See id. at 640, 642.
130 Id. at 642 ("We have no doubt that federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1331 to entertain such a suit."). After Verizon's claim alleged that the state agency order violated federal law, the Court characterized the state order as explicitly preempted by federal law. Id. In 2000, the Court held a Massachusetts foreign trade law preempted by federal foreign trade law. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372. In so doing, the Court progressed quickly to the merits, neither pausing to consider whether jurisdiction existed nor whether the federal law created a cause of action. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion remains just that-a nonbinding dissenting opinion.151 So it holds true that, since 1983 and more frequently in the past several years, the surest route into federal court on a prospective preemption claim has been to make the allegation explicit.152 Jurisdiction is likely assured.153 Whether a cause of action exists and its origin is considerably less relevant until a majority of the Supreme Court holds otherwise.154 Therefore, lack of a cause of action is less of a potential barrier to plaintiffs explicitly alleging preemption.155 Accordingly, arguments have diminished vigor when defendant states or localities attempt to assert that such plaintiffs have no valid cause of action.156
Nevertheless, Independent Living provided state agency defendants a potential opening.157 At least four justices directly indicated that they do not believe that the Supremacy Clause confers an independent cause of action.158 The five majority justices simply decided not to decide whether it does or does not.159 The potential to make the argument and convince at least one of those justices remains in play.160
B. Litigants Who Must Show a Cause of Action
The Court has been more inclined to require a plaintiff to assert a valid cause of action, independent of the Supremacy Clause, to main-tain a suit in which preemption is implied in the allegation that state action violates federal rights, whether statutory or constitutional. 161 The cause of action requirement also applies to plaintiffs who sue pursuant to § 1983, even if the preemption allegation is explicit.162
Implied Allegations
The reasoning behind the distinct treatment of plaintiffs making explicit versus implicit preemption allegations is murky. 163 What is clear, though, is that, when the preemption allegation is implicit, the Court does not follow its express allegation path of heavily emphasizing jurisdictional power while foregoing cause of action analysis. 164 In adjudicating implicit cases, rather, the Court has tended to follow the Sandoval v. Alexander proof-of-Congressional-intent approach in searching for a cause of action in addition to establishing jurisdiction. 165 Even before Sandoval, the Court acknowledged discomfort in permitting preemption suits against state executive action when plaintiffs were unable to establish any cause of action independent of the Supremacy Clause. 166 In 1981, two years before it decided Shaw, the Court declared that two federal laws did not provide a proper cause of action for a plaintiff fisherman who alleged that actions by state and local officials violated federal environmental protection laws. 167 The fisherman in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority et al. v. National Sea Clammers' Ass'n implied preemption by alleging that the state action violated federal law. 168 With the Constitution's separation-of-powers construct in mind, the Court held that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action and therefore, despite the underlying pre-emption the Supremacy Clause implied, the plaintiff's case could not survive. 169 The federal court practice of searching for a cause of action in Congress's intent remains good law.170 In 2001, the Court in Sandoval, a suit to enjoin state action that allegedly violates federal law, held that a plaintiff must prove that Congress intended to create a cause of action in the federal law.171 The holding in Sandoval did not address the Supremacy Clause's capacity to confer a cause of action, and the Court did not explicitly characterize the case as a preemption challenge.172 But when the Court held that the plaintiff in Sandoval could not enjoin the state regulation because there was no proof of Congress's intent to create a cause of action, the Court necessarily implied that the Supremacy Clause could not have conferred a valid cause of action to support such a preemption challenge against the state executive agency's actions.173 The holding reflected the Court's cause of action analysis when confronted with a third type of preemption plaintiffs: those suing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.174
Explicit Allegations in § 1983 Suits
Federal law permits plaintiffs to sue state officials to protect or vindicate constitutionally or statutorily protected rights.175 The provi-169 Id. at 18 ("Where, as here, Congress has made clear that implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment."). That same year, the Court decided California v. Sierra Club, holding that the relevant federal law did not create a private cause of action for plaintiff environmentalists to enjoin state water agencies from allegedly violating federal water law. 451 U.S. at 293-94. Notwithstanding the preemption implication in the allegation that state action violated federal law, the Court probed for a valid cause of action. Id. When it failed to find one, it dismissed the case, again mindful of the separation-of-powers boundaries that prevent a federal court from creating a cause of action when Congress has not. Id. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-sion, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is applicable in the preemption setting when a plaintiff alleges that local action infringes on the plaintiff's federal rights.176 The Court's adjudication of preemption in a § 1983 context varies significantly with regard to cause of action analysis from non- § 1983 claims that explicitly allege prospective preemption.177 Since 1989, the Court has unambiguously permitted plaintiffs to rely on § 1983 to sue for prospective relief against local officials whose conduct is allegedly preempted by federal law.178 The Court requires, however, that, when a plaintiff in a preemption suit relies on § 1983 to prospectively vindicate federal rights, the plaintiff must identify a valid cause of action within the federal statute or constitutional provision that gives rise to the federal right.179 The requirement to point to a valid cause of action places such suits squarely in the Sandoval line of cases implicitly alleging preemption as opposed to the Shaw-Verizon line of cases wherein the Court did not require a valid cause of action when the preemption allegation or characterization was explicit.180
In practice, § 1983 preemption cases follow standard cause of action analysis.181 The Court most emphatically endorsed this approach nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
176 
A. Similarly Situated Plaintiffs Should Be Treated Alike
The content of a pleading or a court's characterization of an action should not increase or decrease the cause of action burden for a preemption plaintiff.196 Likewise, defendant states' or localities' de-fenses should not depend on the type of preemption plaintiff.197 Preemption plaintiffs can generally be described as plaintiffs who: (1) explicitly allege preemption ("Shaw plaintiffs"),198 (2) implicitly allege preemption ("Sandoval plaintiffs"),199 or (3) rely on § 1983 to assert that federal law preempts local action that infringes on their federal rights (" § 1983 plaintiffs"). 200 In many cases, the art of pleading or the court's characterization of an action could move a plaintiff from one category to another category. 201 The distribution of justice is inequitable when such similarly situated parties-those whose basic case rests on the alleged federal preemption of state or local action-receive such varied treatment. 202 When Shaw plaintiffs use the word preemption, they send a signal to the court that the case not only arises under federal law but that the Supremacy Clause controls its resolution. 203 The signal is powerful because, in one step, it establishes jurisdiction and introduces the merits question of whether the relevant federal law preempts the state law.204 Cast in that frame, federal courts seem to reach the merits of such cases appropriately; after all, the federal judiciary exists in part to protect the vitality of the Supremacy Clause.205
That frame, however, is not viable because it enables plaintiffs seeking prospective relief from state action to successfully allege preemption by relying on a federal law that was never meant to protect such plaintiffs.206 Indeed, if that were the law, then every federal law could be said to contain a cause of action by way of the Supremacy Clause in a preemption case. 207 By not requiring Shaw plaintiffs to establish a separate cause of action, the Court enables Shaw plaintiffs to manipulate congressional legislation beyond its intended purpose. 208 The Court has resisted such manipulation in cases involving § 1983 plaintiffs and Sandoval plaintiffs.209 Comparatively, there is nothing extraordinary about Shaw plaintiffs or their cases that should obviate the need for cause of action analysis. 210 Between § 1983 preemption plaintiffs and Shaw plaintiffs, the preemptive nature of their claims are virtually identical, clearly stated through the use of "preemption" in the pleadings. 211 The only significant difference is that the invocation of § 1983 signals to a court that it must engage in a cause of action analysis because of the § 1983 doctrine that requires an independent cause of action analysis. 212 Several lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's handling of Shaw preemption cases as affirming that the Supremacy Clause implies a cause of action.218 Although doing so increases the likelihood that federal courts will strike down state laws that impermissibly conflict with federal laws, the practice misreads the history and purpose of the Supremacy Clause. 219 The Framers inserted the Supremacy Clause into the Constitution to give explicit voice to the idea of federalism-that the nation would be comprised of sovereign states free to make their own laws, except that if those laws conflicted with federal law then federal law would control. 220 The Supremacy Clause constitutionalized federal supremacy. 221 The Framers did not intend, however, for the Supremacy Clause to be a right unto itself.222 Unlike, for instance, the constitutional right to habeas corpus, the Supremacy Clause does not give citizens a right to federalism.223 It is distinct from some amendments in the Bill of Rights in that it does not create a right like freedom of speech224 and freedom from illegal search and seizure,225 or a right to a jury trial in a criminal prosecution.226 Instead, the Supremacy Clause ranks rights that exist elsewhere. 227 Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has explicitly adhered to this interpretation of the Supremacy Clause as containing the limited power to rank conflicting rights.228 A suggestion that the Supremacy Clause creates a private cause of action in the same manner, for instance, as the Fourteenth Amendment, misreads the purpose and history of the Supremacy Clause.229
In the nearly two decades since Shaw, nevertheless, inferior courts have determined that the Supreme Court has suggested otherwisethat the Supremacy Clause does, in fact, imply a cause of action in the preemption arena. Extracting from Shaw and Verizon that the Supremacy Clause does imply a cause of action in the preemption context, as have lower courts, is certainly reasonable.234 After all, in both Shaw and Verizon, the Court reached the merits of preemption suits without requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a cause of action.235 For a Court that has reflected sensitivity about engaging a cause of action analysis over the past three-plus decades with development of the Sandoval and Gonzaga standards,236 foregoing such an analysis in the preemption context resonates with powerful influence. 237 The value of the Supremacy Clause to a federal court, however, should be irrelevant unless and until a case is properly before a court with respect to cause of action and jurisdiction.238 Analyzing the preemptive nature of a federal law in contrast to a state law involves examining the merits of a case. 239 Only if a plaintiff sues pursuant to a valid cause of action should a court reach the merits.240 Artificially increasing access to federal courts by reading a cause of action into the Supremacy Clause for all preemption plaintiffs does not support the rule of law because the relevance of the Supremacy Clause should become apparent only when both jurisdiction and cause of action hurdles are cleared.241 Moreover, implying a cause of action in the Supremacy Clause against the Framers' intentions dangerously injects flexibility into a provision that was conceived and written with rigid outlines.242
C. Adherence to the Separation-of-Powers Principle
The Court has long been sensitive about its role in the expression of government, reflecting awareness of the separation-of-powers principle embodied in the Constitution.243 When federal courts inject the Supremacy Clause with cause of action power, they improperly infringe separation-of-power principles.244 If Congress had not made a political choice to create a cause of action for a particular plaintiff, then the judiciary, as the nonpolitical branch of government, should not step into legislative shoes and imply one.245
As if the Court's articulation of its own role were not enough to limit its ability to imply a cause of action, the Sandoval Court noted that Congress's essential role in creating causes of action was acutely understood, stating that " [p] [P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist . . . .
Id.
; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297 ("The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide."); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167. Notably, the Marbury Court laid out guidelines for when it could overrule executive and legislative conduct, specifying that when Congress legislated outside the bounds of the Constitution and when the President violated individual rights, the Court could intercede. Therefore, when Congress, with its keen understanding of its role in establishing a cause of action, passes a law without a cause of action for a class of plaintiffs, it makes a political choice to withhold such a cause of action.247 When a preemption plaintiff relies on a federal law without a cause of action and the federal court uses Shaw and Verizon to imply a cause of action through the Supremacy Clause, the federal court crosses a separation-of-powers boundary that otherwise constrains the law-making power of the federal government.248 Such law making opens the so-called nonpolitical branch to charges of improper political activity because it takes political power out of the hands of Congress and assumes it for the judiciary.249
The lower federal courts that have turned to Shaw and Verizon to imply causes of action through the Supremacy Clause have not questioned their authority to do so in a separation-of-powers context. 250 Instead, they have asserted that the Court has implied a cause of action within the Supremacy Clause. 251 To accept the argument that a plaintiff may bring a preemption claim solely under the Supremacy Clause is to overlook the incongruity between the federal judiciary's constitutional role and the assertion of a cause of action power in the Supremacy Clause. 252 The implication that the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action in preemption cases means that every federal law contains a cause of action for every potential plaintiff.253 This premise, in the sensitive cause of action environment of federal court, is simply implausible; it turns the principle of separation of powers on its head.254 What would be the point of Congress choosing to withhold a cause of action if one could simply be im-rejecting state and local governments' arguments that preemption plaintiffs assert no valid cause of action to enforce federal law. 263 Lower courts have been more explicit than the Supreme Court, however, relying on the fact that the Verizon Court reached the merits of the suit without conducting a thorough cause of action analysis to determine whether the Supremacy Clause implies a cause of action in preemption cases. 264 In light of federalism concerns reflected in the presumption against preemption doctrine, the notion that the Supremacy Clause implies a cause of action in preemption cases becomes all the more dubious; this interpretation necessarily deprives state and local governments of an affirmative defense, the very defense that led the Sandoval state defendant to victory.265 If causes of action are read into the Supremacy Clause, state defendants will lose the ability to argue that the allegedly preemptive federal statute provides no cause of action; this argument would be moot in face of courts asserting that the Supremacy Clause provides an unspoken cause of action. 266 State defendants should take note that the Supreme Court provided an opening in Independent Living to defend against preemption suits by arguing that plaintiffs lack a cause of action.267 Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Samuel Alito, stated vigorously that the Supremacy Clause does not provide an independent cause of action.268 The majority opinion did not arrive at a conclusion to such a question.269 Instead, it delayed resolution for another day, meaning that any one of the five justices in the majority could join the dissent when, at long last, the Court has to decide whether the Supremacy Clause contains an implied cause of action.270
